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DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS AND THE EROSION OF CORPORATE  
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
DAVID M. UHLMANN∗ 
On April 5, 2010, a massive explosion killed twenty-nine miners 
at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine near Montcoal, West Vir-
ginia.1  Following the explosion, President Barack Obama vowed that 
the U.S. Department of Labor would conduct “the most thorough 
and comprehensive investigation possible” and work with the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“Justice Department” or the “Department”) to 
address any criminal violations.2  Later in the month, the President 
and Vice President flew to West Virginia to eulogize the victims and 
comfort their families.3  It was the nation’s worst coal mining disaster 
in forty years.4 
The tragic loss of life at the Upper Big Branch mine was not an 
accident.5  After a twenty-month investigation, the Mine Safety and 
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 1.  MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION, FATAL UNDERGROUND MINE EXPLOSION, APRIL 5, 2010, at 1 (2010) [here-
inafter MSHA REPORT]. 
 2.  Id.; see also Ian Urbina, No Survivors Found After West Virginia Mine Disaster, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at A1.  
 3.  See Peter Baker, A Time for Farewells, Tearful Reminiscences and Promises of Change, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A11 (describing President Obama’s eulogy for the miners lost 
at Upper Big Branch mine). 
 4.  Urbina, supra note 2; Ken Ward Jr. & Andrew Clevenger, Last Four Big Branch Min-
ers Found Dead, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 9, 2010, available at wvga-
zette.com/News/montcoal/201004090857. 
 5.  See MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that the root causes of the explosion 
were Massey’s unlawful policies and practices). 
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Health Administration (“MSHA”) determined that the workers died 
because of a methane and coal dust explosion at the Upper Big 
Branch mine that was “entirely preventable.”6  The MSHA identified 
over 300 violations7 of the Mine Safety and Health Act8 at the Upper 
Big Branch mine, including nine flagrant violations that contributed 
to the explosion.9  Without any of the hedging often found in safety 
investigations, MSHA concluded that Massey’s “unlawful policies and 
practices . . . were the root cause” of the Upper Big Branch mine 
tragedy.10 
To those familiar with Massey’s safety and environmental record, 
the MSHA findings came as no surprise.  In October 2000, a coal slur-
ry impoundment breached at a Massey facility in Martin County, Ken-
tucky, causing 250 million gallons of toxic sludge to ooze into the Big 
Sandy River and polluting surrounding water sources with debris and 
coal dust.11  The spill was more than twenty times the volume of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill and contaminated 100 miles of rivers.12  In Jan-
uary 2008, Massey paid a then-record $20 million in civil penalties for 
thousands of violations of the Clean Water Act committed between 
January 2000 and December 2006.13  At the Upper Big Branch mine, 
Massey had a methane explosion in 1997, and near misses in 2003 
and 2004, because the company repeatedly “mined into a fault zone 
that was a reservoir and conduit for methane.”14 
Yet despite Massey’s poor safety and environmental record, the 
Upper Big Branch mining disaster stood out as a shocking example of 
corporate lawlessness.  Massey routinely provided employees advance 
notice of MSHA inspections at the Upper Big Branch mine, which is a 
federal crime,15 so that safety violations could be concealed from in-
                                                        
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 9. 
 8.  30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965 (2006). 
 9.  MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 9. 
 10.  Id. at 2. 
 11.  A River of Goo on the Loose; 250 Million Gallons of Coal Slurry Oozing in Eastern Ky., 
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2000, at A2. 
 12.  Peter T. Kilborn, A Torrent of Sludge Muddies a Town’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 
2000, at A1. 
 13.  Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Massey Energy to Pay Largest Civil Penalty 
Ever for Water Permit Violations (Jan. 17, 2008); Ken Ward, Jr., Fines to Force Change, Feds 
Say; $20M Penalty Against Massey in Settlement, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 2008, at P1A.  
Massey was also a leading proponent of the practice known as “mountaintop mining,” 
which involves stripping mountaintops of trees, soil, and rock to make mining operations 
more efficient.  See, e.g., Dan Barry, As Mountaintops Fall, a Coal Town Vanishes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2011, at A1.  
 14.  MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
 15.  30 U.S.C. § 820(e) (2006). 
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spectors.16  Massey intimidated its workers so that they would not re-
port safety and health violations to MSHA.17  The company also kept 
two sets of books at the Upper Big Branch mine—perhaps the most 
egregious evidence of criminal intent in regulatory cases—one for in-
ternal use that noted violations and one for safety inspectors that did 
not.18 
The MSHA found that the Upper Big Branch tragedy occurred 
because Massey allowed unsafe working conditions to persist, and be-
cause it ignored other safety measures that would have prevented the 
explosion and the resulting loss of life.19  Methane was released into 
the mine because Massey mined in a fault zone that it knew had re-
leased methane in the past.20  Methane accumulated and became ex-
plosive because Massey failed to provide adequate ventilation or roof 
control in the mine.21  The methane subsequently ignited because 
Massey used a shearing device that was missing seven water spray noz-
zles and therefore did not have adequate water pressure to move me-
thane away from the shearer and prevent sparking.22  Further, Massey 
allowed dangerous levels of loose coal, coal dust, and float coal dust to 
accumulate over the days, weeks, and months leading up to the explo-
sion, providing an enormous fuel source for the deadly blast that 
killed miners nearly a mile from the methane release and ignition.23 
The Upper Big Branch mine disaster cried out for criminal pros-
ecution under the Mine Safety and Health Act, both for the willful vi-
olations of the Act that caused the explosion and the resulting worker 
deaths, and for the advance notice of safety inspections that sought to 
conceal the hundreds of safety violations at the mine.24  The tragedy 
also provided a textbook example of a conspiracy to defraud the 
United States25 and to obstruct the due administration of justice,26 be-
                                                        
 16.  MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 17.  Id. at 5. 
 18.  Id. at 4. 
 19.  Id. at 6–8. 
 20.  Id. at 6. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 6–7. 
 23.  Id. at 7–8. 
 24.  See 30 U.S.C. § 820 (d) (2006) (willful violations of mine safety regulations); 30 
U.S.C. § 820 (e) (advance notice of inspections). 
 25.  18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); cf. United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957) (up-
holding convictions of conspiracy to defraud the Treasury Department through tax eva-
sion and fraud). 
 26.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006) (concerning obstruction of proceedings before 
departments, agencies, and committees); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006) (concerning obstruc-
tion, alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations and bankruptcy). 
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cause of Massey’s efforts to thwart the government’s mine safety regu-
lations. 
The Justice Department indicted the head of security at the Up-
per Big Branch mine for lying about the practice of giving advance 
notice of inspections and attempting to destroy evidence.27  The Jus-
tice Department also charged the mine superintendent at the Upper 
Big Branch mine with conspiracy to violate the federal government’s 
mine safety laws for his role in allowing rampant safety violations at 
the mine.28  Both defendants have received prison sentences.29  In ad-
dition, a third Massey official, who was the top official at another Mas-
sey mine, has been charged with conspiracy to defraud the United 
States,30 which suggests that the criminal activity that caused the Up-
per Big Branch tragedy extended to other Massey facilities.  Since two 
Massey officials entered plea agreements that required their coopera-
tion in the investigation,31 it is possible that other individuals also will 
be charged. 
The prosecution of Massey officials for the Upper Big Branch 
tragedy and for crimes committed at other Massey facilities is a posi-
tive development.  If corporate officials at Massey or other companies 
are considering similar conduct in the future, they will know they 
could go to jail for putting the lives of mine workers at risk, just as 
other white collar criminals face the possibility of jail time for their 
crimes.  Corporate officials are more likely to refuse to engage in 
criminal activity and less likely to discount the risk of getting caught 
when the consequence is a loss of personal freedom, as opposed to 
financial penalties.32  There is no better deterrent to corporate crime 
                                                        
 27.  Ken Ward, Jr., UBB Security Chief Charged with Lying, Destroying Files, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 2011, available at http://wvgazette.com/News/201102280915. 
 28.  Ken Ward, Jr., Super at UBB Mine Charged by Feds, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 23, 
2012, at P1A. 
 29.  Ken Ward, Jr., UBB Disaster; Mine Official Gets 21 Months Superintendent Violated Safe-
ty Regulations, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 2013, at P1A; Ken Ward, Jr., Upper Big Branch 
Disaster Conviction of Massey Official for Lying, Obstruction Is Upheld, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, 
Dec. 15, 2012, at P2A. 
 30.  Jess Bidgood, Ex-Official Is Charged After Deaths at Coal Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
2012, at A20. 
 31.  Ken Ward, Jr., Massey Official Cooperating as Probe Widens, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, 
Nov. 29, 2012, at P1A; Ken Ward, Jr., UBB Superintendent to Plead Guilty, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 2012, at P8A. 
 32.  See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental 
Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1443 (2011) [hereinafter Uhlmann, 
After the Spill] (explaining that “[c]orporate officials are more likely to comply with the law 
when they fear that they may go to jail if their violations are discovered,” and noting that 
monetary fines are not as great a deterrent as prison sentences). 
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than the realization that criminal activity could result in incarcera-
tion. 
The most effective way to combat corporate crime, however, is to 
prosecute the individuals who committed the offenses and the com-
panies involved.  The law on corporate liability is well established in 
the United States, making clear that corporations are criminally re-
sponsible for the criminal acts of their employees committed within 
the scope of their employment.33  While employees may commit viola-
tions for personal reasons, corporate liability is imposed when they 
act, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.34  Moreover, corporate 
crime often occurs because the companies involved lack adequate 
management structures to prevent wrongdoing.  Prosecution of cor-
porations ensures that criminal activity is punished and deterred, that 
structural reforms occur to promote future compliance efforts, and 
that corporate lawlessness like Massey’s receives the societal condem-
nation it deserves.35 
It is hard to imagine a case in the last decade where corporate 
criminal prosecution was more warranted than the Upper Big Branch 
mining disaster.  The nature and seriousness of the violations could 
not have been greater: Massey’s willful violations of federal mine safe-
ty laws resulted in twenty-nine deaths and the worst mining disaster in 
the United States in more than forty years. On that basis alone, crimi-
nal prosecution would have been warranted.  Massey also engaged in 
a deliberate, long-standing, and deceitful effort to thwart the mine 
                                                        
 33.  See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (holding that the 
conduct of an employee “while exercising the authority delegated to him” can be attribut-
ed to his employer, upon whom penalties can be imposed); United States v. Hilton Hotels, 
467 F.2d 1000, 1004–06 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that the criminal liability of an employer 
for the acts of its employees within the scope of their employment can be either express or 
implied); cf. United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F 2d. 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (uphold-
ing the “collective knowledge” doctrine in the realm of corporate criminal liability, which 
attributes the knowledge of all a corporation’s employees and agents to the corporation as 
an entity). 
 34.  See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d. 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that an 
employee acts within the scope of employment if “acts are motivated—at least in part—by 
the intent to benefit the corporation”); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc. 770 
F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming a conviction despite claim that employee acted for 
his own benefit because employee acted at least in part to benefit the corporation). 
 35.  See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 854–59 
(2007) [hereinafter Garrett, Structural Reform] (explaining how the prosecution of entire 
agencies can lead to agreements that include increased corporate compliance with federal 
regulations); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 609, 618–22 (1998) (explaining the role of expression of societal condemnation in 
the criminal prosecution of corporations); Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra note 32, at 1452–
53 (discussing societal condemnation that comes from corporate prosecutions and noting 
the relation between criminal prosecution and deterrence). 
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safety laws that were enacted to prevent exactly this kind of tragedy.  
Even without the worker deaths, it would have been appropriate to 
prosecute Massey for its false and misleading conduct and its efforts to 
undermine safety.36 
Instead, on the same day that MSHA issued a 972-page investiga-
tive report that lay bare the lawlessness that occurred within Massey, 
the Justice Department announced that it was entering a non-
prosecution agreement with the new owners of Massey and therefore 
would not bring criminal charges against the company.37  The United 
States Attorney justified the non-prosecution because Massey’s new 
owners had agreed to enhance its compliance programs and de-
scribed the non-prosecution agreement as “the largest-ever resolution 
in a criminal investigation of a mine disaster.”38  But there was no mis-
taking the outcome: there would be no criminal charges brought 
against Massey, no guilty plea or admission of liability by Massey, and 
no sentencing hearing where the families of the victims could address 
the court about their suffering, as victims have a right to do under the 
Crime Victim’s Rights Act of 1984.39 
I have written elsewhere that the Justice Department did not live 
up to its name when it agreed not to prosecute Massey for its crimes.40  
The failure to prosecute Massey sent a terrible message about how our 
society views corporate misconduct and sowed doubts about the Jus-
tice Department’s commitment to address corporate crime.  As a for-
mer federal prosecutor, I supervised or handled hundreds of corpo-
rate criminal prosecutions that, while serious, did not involve the trag-
                                                        
 36.  Other factors also warranted prosecution of Massey.  The violations at the Upper 
Big Branch mine were pervasive—there were over 300 violations at the mine unrelated to 
the explosion, according to the MSHA report.  MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.  Massey 
and its subsidiaries committed similar violations at other mines and were responsible for 
egregious environmental violations too, making clear that this was not the conduct of one 
Massey subsidiary or rogue Massey employees.  Massey did not have an effective compli-
ance program in place at Upper Big Branch: it threatened workers when they reported 
safety violations.  See MSHA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.  In addition, senior management at 
Massey-owned mines threatened workers and punished those who made safety corrections.  
Id.  On one occasion when production was halted to address safety issues at Upper Big 
Branch, the president of the Massey subsidiary that operated the mine reportedly stated, 
“If you don’t start running coal up there, I’m going to bring the whole crew outside and 
get rid of every one of you.”  Id. 
 37.  David M. Uhlmann, For 29 Dead Miners, No Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at A25 
[hereinafter Uhlmann, No Justice]. 
 38.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alpha Natural Resources Inc. and Department 
of Justice Reach $209 Million Agreement Related to Upper Big Branch Mine Explosion 
(Dec. 6, 2011).  Alpha Natural Resources was the new owner of Massey and had successor 
liability for its misconduct.  Id. 
 39.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006). 
 40.  Uhlmann, No Justice, supra note 37. 
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tragic loss of life that occurred at the Upper Big Branch mine41 and 
rarely involved anything close to the rampant corporate misconduct 
committed by Massey.42  If it was not appropriate to prosecute Massey 
for its crimes, it is difficult for me to envision when criminal prosecu-
tion of any corporation would be warranted. 
The Justice Department’s deal with Massey continues a disturb-
ing trend where corporations avoid criminal charges by entering de-
ferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements.43  The practice is 
not consistent across the Department: in the Environment and Natu-
ral Resources Division and the Antitrust Division, deferred prosecu-
tion and non-prosecution agreements are rarely used; in the Criminal 
Division and some United States Attorney’s offices, such agreements 
have become almost the norm.44  The terms of the agreements are at-
tractive to the government, because they often provide large penal-
ties, far-reaching corporate compliance programs with outside moni-
tors approved by the Department, and promises of cooperation by the 
companies involved.45  But plea agreements—the preferred approach 
prior to the last decade—can offer the same benefits to the govern-
ment without making it appear that large companies can buy their 
way out of criminal prosecution.46 
In this Article, I argue that the use of deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements in the Upper Big Branch mining case 
                                                        
 41.  Id. 
 42.  The closest parallel to Massey is McWane, Inc., a large pipe manufacturing com-
pany, which was prosecuted for violations of worker safety and environmental laws and 
concealing illegal activities from federal inspectors.  See David M. Uhlmann, Prosecuting 
Worker Endangerment: The Need for Stronger Criminal Penalties for Violations of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, Sept. 2008, at 1976–77 (describing 
the investigation of McWane and the subsequent pleas and fines); David Barstow & Lowell 
Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, an Indifference to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A1 (giving 
examples of the dangerous working conditions at McWane). 
 43.  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE CRIME (2009) [here-
inafter GAO CORP. CRIME] (“Recently, [the Justice Department] has made more use of 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs), in which prose-
cutors may require company reform, among other things, in exchange for deferring pros-
ecution.”).  Deferred prosecution agreements typically allow prosecutors to file criminal 
charges but stay or dismiss those charges after a period of time if the company fulfills cer-
tain obligations.  Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a 
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1104 
(2006).  Non-prosecution agreements allow companies to avoid prosecution, and the col-
lateral consequences associated with prosecution, altogether in exchange for their cooper-
ation.  Id. at 1105.  For a more in-depth discussion of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, see infra Part I.A. 
 44.  See infra Part II.A. 
 45.  GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 1. 
 46.  See infra Part II.B. 
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and other high-profile matters erodes corporate criminal liability and 
undermines the rule of law.  I assert that deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements limit the punitive and deterrent value of 
the government’s law enforcement efforts and extinguish the societal 
condemnation that should accompany criminal prosecution.47  I side 
with those within the Justice Department who have resisted the trend 
toward deferred prosecution and non-prosecution of corporate crime 
and agree with critics who claim that the Department may lack suffi-
cient policies to ensure that abuse of power does not occur in negoti-
ating such agreements.48  I conclude that the government does not 
need the “middle ground” of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, except for less serious violations where there 
are no civil or administrative remedies or perhaps in the rare situation 
where prosecutors can demonstrate that a criminal conviction would 
cause unacceptable harm to innocent third parties.49 
Part I will trace the evolution of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements for corporations from pretrial diversion pro-
grams for individual defendants and will explain how the Justice De-
partment adjusted its corporate prosecution policies to facilitate non-
criminal alternatives to corporate prosecution.  Part II will summarize 
empirical evidence about the surge in deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements over the last decade and will consider justifi-
cations for the increase as well as resulting concerns.  Part III will ex-
plain why deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements 
erode corporate criminal liability and will demonstrate how their 
widespread use is ill-advised from a theoretical and a practical per-
spective.  Part IV will conclude that the Justice Department should 
develop guidelines that prohibit the use of deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements in egregious cases and impose approval 
requirements to limit their use to the unusual occasions when ade-




                                                        
 47.  See infra Part III.A. 
 48.  See infra Part II.A (noting disparate approaches to deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements within the Justice Department); Part II.C (discussing criticism 
from outside the Department about the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements). 
 49.  See infra Part III.C. 
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I.  THE EMERGENCE OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS AND THE CORRESPONDING 
EVOLUTION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S CORPORATE 
PROSECUTION POLICIES 
Over the last decade, the use of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements has surged within the Justice Department, 
particularly its Criminal Division and several United States Attorneys’ 
Offices.50  The Department’s Corporate Fraud Task Force,51 begun by 
the Bush administration after the Enron scandal, pioneered the abil-
ity of federal prosecutors to use non-criminal alternatives to obtain 
corporate cooperation, including waivers of attorney-client privilege 
and the work product doctrine.52  Even after privilege waivers became 
disfavored, the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements continued unabated during the remaining years of the 
Bush administration and the first four years of the Obama administra-
tion.53 
The use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments has its roots in pretrial diversion programs for individual de-
fendants.  For a wide range of reasons, including the desire to avoid 
draconian effects on first-term offenders and the need to conserve 
prosecutorial and judicial resources, most prosecuting offices have 
pretrial diversion programs. This Part begins with an explanation of 
the role of pretrial diversion and its potential application to the cor-
porate setting.  I then review the events that prompted the increased 
use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements for 
corporate crime and the accompanying shifts in the government’s 
prosecution policies. 
                                                        
 50.  GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 13–16; see also Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ash-
ley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, University of Virginia School of Law, 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp (last updated 
June 7, 2013) [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements] (maintaining an exten-
sive, and regularly updated, list of Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements). 
 51.  See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (2002) (terminated by Establish-
ment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Pres. Exec. Order, Nov. 17, 2009). 
 52.  See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 311, 319–20 (2007). 
 53.  See infra text accompanying note 177. 
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A.  Pretrial Diversion for Individual Defendants and the Implications for 
Corporate Defendants 
Prosecutors have used pretrial diversion agreements to resolve 
cases involving individual defendants for decades.  In most cases, pre-
trial diversions occur either before or soon after charges are filed.54  
In a pretrial diversion agreement, the defendant is usually required to 
acknowledge and accept responsibility for the misconduct, seek any 
necessary counseling or treatment (for anger management or drug 
addiction, for example), make restitution to any victims, and perform 
community service.55  The criminal case is held in abeyance while the 
defendant completes the terms of the diversion program,56 usually 
twelve to eighteen months.57  Once that period elapses, if the defend-
ant has not committed other crimes and has otherwise complied with 
the terms of the agreement, the prosecutor drops the criminal charg-
es.58 
Eligibility for pretrial diversion varies widely based on the prose-
cuting office but is typically limited to first-time offenders who have 
committed relatively minor offenses.59  Some offices might limit pre-
trial diversion to youthful offenders who have no prior criminal rec-
ords, while all first-time offenders might be eligible in other jurisdic-
tions.60  Some offices might allow pretrial diversion for misdemeanors 
but prohibit pretrial diversion for felonies.61  Other offices might in-
                                                        
 54.  See United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.010 (2009) [hereinafter USAM], availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/22mcrm.htm 
(explaining the timing, purpose, and objectives of pretrial diversion); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3154(10) (2006) (stating that a function of pretrial services is to collect, verify, and pre-
pare reports pertaining to pretrial diversion agreements and to perform “such other du-
ties” as required by the agreements). 
 55.  JOHN CLARK, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL DIVERSION AND THE LAW I-1 
(2006), available at www.napsa.org/publications/ptdivcaselaw.pdf.  Some jurisdictions, but 
not all, require a defendant to plead guilty to the charges at the beginning of the program.  
Id. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  See USAM § 9-22.010 (stating that the maximum period of supervision is eighteen 
months). 
 58.  CLARK, supra note 55, at I-1. 
 59.  See id. at VI-4-5 (providing an example of a defendant who was removed from the 
pretrial diversion program because of prior convictions); see also USAM § 9-22.100 (stating 
that a prosecutor can exercise discretion and offer diversion to an  offender with fewer 
than two prior felony convictions). 
 60.  See USAM § 9-22.010 (giving prosecutors discretion to use pretrial diversion for 
any individual “against whom a prosecutable case exists”). 
 61.  See, e.g., IND. CODE § 33-39-1-8(d)(1) (through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (allowing prosecu-
tor to withhold prosecution in misdemeanor cases); ORANGE CNTY. CORR. DEP’T, 
MISDEMEANOR/DUI PRETRIAL DIVERSION INFORM. 1 (2012), available at 
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stead allow pretrial diversion for all non-violent offenses or limit their 
programs to those charged with certain offenses.62 
The theoretical basis for pretrial diversion is utilitarian.  First, for 
less serious criminal charges, the societal benefits of prosecution may 
be outweighed by the costs to the defendant, particularly where 
youthful offenders are involved.  A criminal record, even for a minor 
offense, could make it difficult for the individual to pursue educa-
tional or employment opportunities.63  If the defendant is able to suc-
cessfully complete the pretrial diversion program, it is better for socie-
ty to give the defendant a second chance and not to burden her with 
a criminal conviction.64  Second, investigative and prosecutorial re-
sources are limited—as are judicial resources—so it is better for socie-
ty if the government reserves criminal prosecution for more serious 
crimes and defendants who are repeat violators.65 
The Justice Department’s policies on pretrial diversion reflect 
the prevailing view that eligibility for diversion should be limited to 
certain categories of offenders and offenses.66  United States Attorneys 
are authorized to divert individuals who do not have two or more pri-
or felony convictions,67 which is consistent with the general approach 
that diversion should be limited to individuals with little or no crimi-
nal record and should not be available to recidivists.68 United States 
Attorneys also are prohibited from offering diversion to current or 
former public officials accused of an offense involving a violation of a 
public trust or individuals accused of an offense related to national 
security or foreign affairs.69  These limitations, although perhaps more 
permissive than those implemented by individual districts, reflect the 
                                                        
www.orangecountyfl.net/Portals/0/resource%20library/jail/Pretrial%20Diversion%20Inf
ormation.pdf (allowing pretrial diversion in misdemeanor and DUI cases only). 
 62.  CLARK, supra note 55, at I-1. 
 63.  See, e.g., Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 623, 635–36 (2006) (discussing several federal and state consequences of criminal 
convictions). 
 64.  CLARK, supra note 55, at I-1 (describing how pretrial diversion attempts to address 
the underlying causes of the arrest so that offenders are “less likely to return to court on 
new charges in the future”). 
 65.  See id. (stating that pretrial diversion programs successfully reduce criminal court 
caseloads). 
 66.  USAM § 9-22.000; see also USAM, CRIMINAL RES. MANUAL 712, 715. 
 67.  USAM § 9-22.100. 
 68.  See CLARK, supra note 55, at VI-4 (explaining that many pretrial diversion programs 
are reserved exclusively for first-time offenders). 
 69.  USAM § 9-22.100. 
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widespread belief that more serious crimes should not be eligible for 
pretrial diversion. 
The Justice Department’s approach to pretrial diversion also re-
flects the utilitarian theoretical basis for diversion.  The United States 
Attorneys’ Manual notes that pretrial diversion seeks to “prevent fu-
ture criminal activity among certain offenders by diverting them from 
traditional processing into community supervision and services.”70  In 
this respect, pretrial diversion is geared toward the rehabilitation of 
first-time offenders or those with limited criminal records.71  The 
United States Attorneys’ Manual also indicates that a primary objec-
tive of pretrial diversion is “[t]o save prosecutive and judicial re-
sources for concentration on major cases.”72  By implication, pretrial 
diversion would not be available for major crimes. 
I agree that pretrial diversion should be an option in cases involv-
ing youthful or first-time offenders who are accused of less serious 
crimes.  While rehabilitation may have gone out of favor in our crimi-
nal justice system,73 there is no disputing the impact of a criminal 
conviction on an individual’s future and her potential contributions 
to society.74  If diversion allows her to be successful and ensures that 
she does not engage in future criminal activity, then society and the 
individual benefit.  At the same time, there are crimes that are so se-
rious that diversion would not be appropriate.  Homicide, rape, and 
other violent crimes are obvious examples; for other crimes, where to 
draw the line depends upon the law enforcement priorities and re-
sources of the prosecuting office.75 
Of course, if pretrial diversion is appropriate for some individual 
defendants, it could be argued that deferred prosecution might be 
appropriate for some corporate defendants.  Perhaps if a corporate 
defendant has a strong compliance record and commits a relatively 
minor offense, deferred prosecution might make sense.  As with pre-
trial diversion, there might be variations in eligibility requirements 
across prosecuting offices.  Some offices might limit deferred prose-
                                                        
 70.  USAM § 9-22.010. 
 71.  CLARK, supra note 55, at II-I. 
 72.  USAM § 9-22.010. 
 73.  MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 28–29 (2003); see also Michael Vitello, 
Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1012–13 (1991) (noting that the rehabili-
tative view of the criminal justice system has given way to one that now focuses on retribu-
tion). 
 74.  See Pinard, supra note 63, at 635–36 (discussing several of the federal and state 
consequences of criminal convictions). 
 75.  See also CLARK, supra note 55, at I-2, I-3 (discussing the various ways different juris-
dictions approach pretrial diversions). 
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cutions to companies that had no history of violations, while others 
might focus on criminal histories.  Some offices might limit deferred 
prosecutions to misdemeanors, while others might allow for some fel-
onies where there was no harm caused by the conduct.  If the pretrial 
diversion model were followed, however, a corporate defendant with a 
history of violations—or one that committed a more serious crime—
would not be eligible for deferred prosecution. 
On the other hand, a large number of corporate prosecutions 
occur in the regulatory context, where the government has discretion 
whether to pursue criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement.76  
Where the government has multiple enforcement options, it may not 
be necessary to have an alternative like deferred prosecution.  In cases 
where a defendant without a history of violations commits a relatively 
minor crime, it might make sense to decline prosecution in favor of 
civil or administrative enforcement.77  Given the prevalence of regula-
tory crime, it might be appropriate to limit deferred prosecutions to 
(1) law enforcement programs where civil or administrative enforce-
ment is not an adequate alternative to prosecution and (2) first-time 
offenders who engage in less serious criminal activity.78 
In sum, the pretrial diversion model would justify deferred pros-
ecution agreements for corporate crime, if prosecutors limited eligi-
bility based on the defendant’s compliance history and the type of vio-
lations involved.  Or the government could pursue a hybrid approach 
where deferred prosecution agreements were used only where civil or 
administrative enforcement was not a viable alternative to prosecu-
tion.  Instead, the government has pursued neither of these defensi-
ble approaches as it has turned to deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements in many of its most high-profile cases over 
the last decade, even in cases where the defendants had poor compli-
ance records and had committed egregious crimes.79 
B.  The Justice Department’s Corporate Prosecution Policies Evolve With 
the Increased Use of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution as 
Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution 
Prior to 2001, the Justice Department rarely entered deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements with corporations as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution. A study by University of Virginia 
                                                        
 76.  USAM § 9-28.1100. 
 77.  USAM § 9-28.600. 
 78.  See infra Part III.A-B. 
 79.  See infra Part II. 
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Law Professor Brandon L. Garrett identified only thirteen deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements in the nine years prior 
to 2001.80  In the five years that followed, however, the Justice De-
partment entered thirty-nine deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, including twenty-six in 2004 and 2005.81 
The limited number of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements before 2001 is not attributable to an absence 
of corporate prosecution during those years. To the contrary, a data-
base of corporate plea agreements also maintained by Professor Gar-
rett indicates that the Justice Department prosecuted at least 101 
companies for corporate crime  in 2000 alone.82  Moreover, the Justice 
Department was particularly aggressive in its efforts to prosecute regu-
latory crime. The Corporate Crime Reporter issued a report at the 
end of the 1990s entitled Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade 
that ranked corporate criminals based on the amount of criminal 
fines imposed.83  The report found that the top categories of corpo-
rate crime were “[e]nvironmental (38), antitrust (20), fraud (13), 
campaign finance (7), food and drug (6), [and] financial crimes 
(4) . . . .”84  Regulatory crime almost always involves corporate mis-
conduct and frequently results in corporate charges.85 
                                                        
 80.  Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.  The study identified one 
other case, United States v. Doyon Drilling, Inc., as a deferred prosecution.  Id.  But, in 
Doyon Drilling, the Justice Department agreed to defer prosecution on felony charges in 
exchange for the defendant’s willingness to enter a guilty plea to misdemeanor charges.  
Doyon Drilling Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 3. 
 81.  Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.  Another study by the Corpo-
rate Crime Reporter found that the Justice Department entered only eleven deferred prose-
cution and non-prosecution agreements—a little more than one per year.  In the four 
years that followed, the Department entered twenty-three deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, or nearly six per year.  Russell Mokhiber, Editor, Corp. Crime 
Reporter, Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution Agree-
ments at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/2005/12/. 
 82.  Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, University 
of Virginia School of Law, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea_agreements/home. 
php (last visited June 18, 2013) [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley, Plea Agreements] (maintain-
ing an extensive, and regularly updated, list of Federal Organizational Plea Agreements).  
The database is comprehensive beginning in 2001, so it is likely that there were even more 
than 101 companies prosecuted during calendar year 2000. 
 83.  Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade, CORP. CRIME REP. 
(Sept. 7, 1999), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/top100.html. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra note 32 at 1439 (noting that the “overwhelming ma-
jority of [pollution crimes] are committed by corporations” including Fortune 500 com-
panies such as BP, Exxon, Rockwell, International Paper, Royal Caribbean, Koch Petrole-
um, Tyson Foods, W.R. Grace, and Citgo). 
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The Justice Department, recognizing that corporate crime was 
becoming an increasing focus of its prosecution efforts, decided in 
the mid-1990s to provide guidance for prosecutors of corporate 
crime.86  Then Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder created an ad 
hoc working group coordinated by the Fraud Section of the Criminal 
Division and including representatives from the United States Attor-
neys’ Offices, the Executive Office of United States Attorneys, and the 
litigating divisions of the Department with criminal responsibilities 
(Antitrust, Civil, Civil Rights, Environment and Natural Resources, 
and Tax).87  After an iterative process that included the circulation of 
multiple drafts throughout the Department, the deputy attorney gen-
eral issued the “Federal Prosecution of Corporations” guidance on 
June 16, 1999, which would become widely known as the Holder 
Memo.88 
The Holder Memo contains extensive language about the bene-
fits of corporate criminal prosecution.  It notes that corporate prose-
cution allows the government to “be a force for positive change of 
corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, 
and punish white collar crime.”89  It counsels that corporations should 
generally be treated the same as individuals for purposes of corporate 
criminal prosecution, including the goal of deterrence, the conse-
quences of conviction, and the adequacy of non-criminal alterna-
tives.90  It also identifies additional considerations that arise in the 
corporate context, including the pervasiveness of wrongdoing and in-
volvement of management, the history of similar misconduct, the 
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing, the effectiveness of 
any compliance program, and collateral consequences.91 
Significantly, however, the Holder Memo makes no mention of 
deferred prosecution or non-prosecution, even when it discusses non-
criminal alternatives.  Instead, in describing non-criminal alternatives, 
the memorandum identifies only civil or regulatory enforcement ac-
tions as examples.92  In addition, the memorandum notes that non-
criminal sanctions may not be appropriate for egregious violations, a 
pattern of wrongdoing, or when a history of non-criminal sanctions 
                                                        
 86.  Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder on Bringing Crimi-
nal Charges Against Corporations to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys 
(June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo]. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. § II.A.1–8. 
 92.  Id. § X.A. 
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does not produce remediation of the violations.93  In these ways, the 
Holder Memo acknowledged the regulatory nature of most corporate 
crime.  The Holder Memo also reflected how prosecutors exercised 
their discretion in criminal investigations during the 1990s, namely 
choosing whether to prosecute or decline in favor of civil or adminis-
trative enforcement. Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution were 
rarely pursued. 
The Justice Department’s approach to corporate prosecution 
shifted after its ill-fated prosecution of Arthur Andersen LLP (“An-
dersen”) in 2002.  In the wake of Enron’s collapse, and amidst allega-
tions of accounting fraud, Andersen was charged with obstruction of 
justice for shredding documents related to its audits of Enron’s finan-
cial statements.94  Andersen claimed that “rogue employees” destroyed 
the documents, but the shredding of documents occurred even as the 
government was investigating Enron’s accounting practices and after 
Andersen partners expressed concern about the firm’s involvement.95  
Once Andersen was indicted in 2002, the firm hemorrhaged clients 
rapidly and went out of business.96  Andersen later was found guilty at 
trial, but the Supreme Court of the United States overturned its con-
viction based on erroneous jury instructions.97  The Justice Depart-
ment decided not to retry Andersen after the Supreme Court ruling 
because the firm was no longer operating.98 
The Justice Department justified its prosecution of Andersen 
based on the massive losses that occurred at Enron, the widespread 
fraud in the firm’s financial reports, and its legitimate concern about 
the destruction of documents during a pending criminal investiga-
tion.99  In addition, at the time of the Enron scandal, Andersen had 
already incurred a $7 million civil penalty in a Securities and Ex-
change Commission settlement for its role in other cases of account-
ing fraud.100  Nonetheless, observers criticized the Department for 
                                                        
 93.  Id. § X.B. 
 94.  Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged with Ob-
struction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1. 
 95.  Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Wide Efforts Seen in Shredding 
Data on Enron’s Audits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A1. 
 96.  Roquet v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 587-88 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 97.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005). 
 98.  Carrie Johnson, U.S. Ends Prosecution of Arthur Andersen, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 
2005, at D1. 
 99.  See Eichenwald, supra note 94. 
 100.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Arthur Andersen LLP Agrees to Settle-
ment Resulting in First Antifraud Injunction in More Than 20 Years and Largest-Ever Civil 
Penalty ($7 Million) in SEC Enforcement Action Against a Big Five Accounting Firm (June 
19, 2001). 
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prosecuting Andersen, claiming that it amounted to a corporate 
“death penalty” for the firm.101  When Andersen went out of business, 
28,000 employees lost their jobs and competition diminished in the 
accounting industry as the “Big Five” accounting firms were reduced 
to the “Big Four.”102 
The Justice Department responded to criticism of the Andersen 
prosecution by developing revised guidance regarding the prosecu-
tion of corporations in January 2003.103  The new Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations issued by Deputy Attorney 
General Larry Thompson was almost identical to the Holder Memo 
with the exception of the section regarding cooperation.  For the first 
time, the guidance raised the possibility of deferred prosecution for 
corporations. The Holder Memo stated that cooperation and volun-
tary disclosure could warrant “granting a corporation immunity or 
amnesty.”104  The Thompson Memo stated that cooperation and vol-
untary disclosure could merit “granting a corporation immunity or 
amnesty or pretrial diversion.”105 
The inclusion of a reference to pretrial diversion in the Thomp-
son Memo did not trigger an increase in deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements; rather, it codified a change in policy 
that had begun to occur already at the Justice Department, particular-
ly within the Criminal Division, the Corporate Fraud Task Force, and 
some United States Attorneys’ Offices.  As noted above, there were 
thirteen deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements en-
tered by Justice Department prosecutors in the nine years prior to 
2001.106  During 2001 and 2002, prior to issuance of the Thompson 
Memo, United States Attorneys and the Criminal Division entered 
eight deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.107  The 
pace then quickened, with fifteen more deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements during 2003 and 2004 after issuance of 
the Thompson Memo.108 
                                                        
 101.  Carrie Johnson, Ruling Won’t Deter Prosecution of Fraud, WASH. POST, June 1, 2005, 
at D1. 
 102.  See Jonathan D. Glater, Last Task at Andersen: Turning Out the Lights, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 30, 2002), at C3. 
 103.  Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General on Principles 
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Department Components 
and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. 
 104.  Holder Memo, supra note 86, at § VI.A–B. 
 105.  Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § VI.A–B (emphasis added). 
 106.  See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 107.  See Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50. 
 108.  Id. 
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The increase in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements no doubt reflected at least in part concerns about the col-
lateral consequences of criminal convictions and the criticism the Jus-
tice Department received based on Andersen’s demise.  But it merits 
emphasis that the Thompson Memo’s reference to pretrial diversion 
(and thus its endorsement of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution) was not in section IX of the memorandum, which ad-
dressed collateral consequences,109 or in section X of the memoran-
dum, which addressed non-criminal alternatives.110  The discussion of 
collateral consequences was unchanged from the Holder Memo and 
focused on whether to prosecute or to decline—not the middle 
ground of deferred prosecution or non-prosecution.111  Likewise, the 
guidance regarding non-criminal alternatives continued to emphasize 
the alternative of civil or administrative enforcement and made no 
mention of quasi-criminal options.112 
Instead, the Thompson Memo embraced deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements to highlight the value of coopera-
tion by companies involved in criminal activity.113  The cover memo 
circulating the document to the Department stated “[t]he main focus 
of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authen-
ticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”114  While the cover memo also 
referenced compliance programs, the inclusion of language about 
pretrial diversion was limited to Section VI of the memorandum, ad-
dressing cooperation and voluntary disclosure,115 and did not appear 
in Section VII regarding corporate compliance programs (which con-
tinued to focus solely on the choice between prosecution of the cor-
poration and declination).116 
I therefore would argue that the Department’s increased use of 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements initially oc-
curred because the government wanted to obtain as much coopera-
tion as possible from corporations involved in criminal activity.  The 
Holder Memo had authorized prosecutors to seek attorney-client priv-
ilege waivers as a condition of cooperation.117  As a result, prosecutors 
                                                        
 109.  Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § IX. 
 110.  Id. § X. 
 111.  Id. § IX. 
 112.  Id. § X.A. 
 113.  Id. § VI; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 43, at 1105 (noting that deferred prosecu-
tion and non-prosecution agreements lead to increased cooperation by companies). 
 114.  Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at 1 (cover memo). 
 115.  Id. § VI. 
 116.  Id. § VII. 
 117.  Holder Memo, supra note 86, at § VI.B. 
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sought contemporaneous legal advice provided by corporate counsel 
about regulatory compliance and the results of internal investigations 
conducted by outside counsel prior to or during government criminal 
investigations.118  That practice already had begun to draw even more 
heated criticism of the Department than the prosecution of Ander-
sen.  Defense attorneys, including many former Justice Department 
prosecutors, blasted the Department’s interference with the right to 
corporate counsel.119 
The Thompson Memo retained the Holder Memo’s focus on at-
torney-client privilege waivers but added the option of pretrial diver-
sion to the possible outcomes where a corporation cooperated with a 
criminal investigation.120  Under both approaches, prosecutors were to 
follow the principles governing non-prosecution generally when eval-
uating cooperation and voluntary disclosure.121  Those provisions of 
the Principles of Federal Prosecution encouraged prosecutors to seek 
reduced sentences or lesser charges in exchange for cooperation and 
only authorized non-prosecution if it was the only way to obtain need-
ed cooperation,122 which is precisely what happened under the Holder 
Memo where numerous plea agreements called for attorney-client 
privilege waivers.123  In contrast, after the Thompson Memo was is-
sued, an increased number of attorney-client privilege waivers oc-
curred in the context of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements.124 
The shift to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments did not mollify critics of the Justice Department’s requests for 
attorney-client privilege waivers.  As a result, in 2006, the Justice De-
partment again revised its guidance on corporate criminal prosecu-
tion to impose stricter limits on waiver requests and to require prose-
                                                        
 118.  Id. § VI.B n.2; David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New 
World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 156 
(2000). 
 119.  Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Corporation 
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 120.  Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § VI.B. 
 121.  Holder Memo, supra note 86, at § VI; Thompson Memo, supra note 103, at § VI. 
 122.  USAM § 9-27.600. 
 123.  Joe D. Whitley et al., The Expanding Criminalization of Environmental Laws, 77-Jan 
FLA. B.J. 30, 35 (2003) (citing United States v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., No. A99-0141 
CR (D. Ala. 1999); United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 98-0103-CR-
Middlebrooks (S.D. Fla. 1999)). 
 124.  Wray & Hur, supra note 43, at 1137–44 (discussing the increase in alternative reso-
lutions following the Thompson Memo and providing examples). 
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cutors to obtain supervisory approval before making such requests.125  
Like the Thompson Memo, the so-called McNulty Memo only refer-
enced pretrial diversion in its discussion of cooperation.126  Yet the 
controversy over privilege waivers continued unabated.127 
Finally, in 2008, with Congress considering legislation to bar priv-
ilege waiver requests, the Justice Department eliminated any credit for 
attorney-client privilege waivers in yet another revision to its corporate 
prosecution guidelines.128  In so doing, the Department deleted the 
references to pretrial diversion in the cooperation section.129  Instead, 
for the first time, the Department endorsed deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution in the section regarding collateral consequences.130  
The 2008 guidance stated: 
On the other hand, where the collateral consequences of a 
corporate conviction for innocent third parties would be 
significant, it may be appropriate to consider a non-
prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement with condi-
tions designed, among other things, to promote compliance 
with applicable law and to prevent recidivism.  Such agree-
ments are a third option, besides a criminal indictment, on 
the one hand, and a declination, on the other.  Declining 
prosecution may allow a corporate criminal to escape with-
out consequences.  Obtaining a conviction may produce a 
result that seriously harms innocent third parties who played 
no role in the criminal conduct.  Under appropriate circum-
stances, a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agree-
ment can help restore the integrity of a company’s opera-
tions and preserve the financial viability of a corporation 
that has engaged in criminal conduct, while preserving the 
government’s ability to prosecute a recalcitrant corporation 
that materially breaches the agreement.131 
                                                        
 125.  Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General on Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Department Components and 
United States Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo]. 
 126.  Id. § VII.B.1. 
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The Justice Department thus belatedly embraced the rationale that 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements were a neces-
sary “middle ground” between prosecution and declination. 
Whether the Department needs a middle ground between prose-
cution and declination is far from clear, as I discuss in Parts II and III.  
The evolution of the Justice Department’s approach to deferred pros-
ecution and non-prosecution agreements, however, is best described 
as a policy in search of a rationale.  The use of deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements was not contemplated by the Holder 
Memo, despite the surge in corporate prosecutions during the 1990s 
that prompted its issuance.  Even when the concept of pretrial diver-
sion for corporations was introduced by the Thompson Memo and 
reaffirmed by the McNulty Memo, it was solely in the context of ex-
tracting cooperation from corporations consistent with the Depart-
ment’s policies on cooperation more generally.  The idea that prose-
cutors needed a middle ground between criminal prosecution and 
declination emerged years after the practice of using deferred prose-
cution and non-prosecution agreements had taken root within parts 
of the Justice Department.  With such a weak foundation in policy, it 
is no surprise that deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments are used inconsistently within the Justice Department and in 
cases where such agreements may not serve the interests of justice. 
II.  DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 
BECOME THE NORM IN MANY HIGH-PROFILE CASES, EVEN AS THE 
RATIONALE FOR SUCH AGREEMENTS REMAINS ELUSIVE AND 
CONCERNS RISE ABOUT THEIR POTENTIAL MISUSE 
The Justice Department continues to prosecute a large number 
of corporations every year for corporate crime.132  According to a 
study conducted in 2009 by the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”), most corporations still face criminal prosecution, despite 
the increased use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements.133  Professor Garrett’s research supports a similar conclu-
sion, identifying 2166 organizational plea agreements compared to 
283 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements for the 
years covered by his databases.134  Moreover, U.S. Sentencing Commis-
                                                        
 132.  GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 1. 
 133.  Id. at 14–15. 
 134.  Compare Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50 and Garrett & Ash-
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sion data reveals an average of 210 corporate convictions per year 
since 2000.135 
Nonetheless, the Justice Department has made far greater use of 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements over the last 
decade, particularly in cases handled by the Criminal Division, which 
are often the Department’s most high-profile prosecutions.  The 
Criminal Division now enters more deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements than plea agreements.136  The dramatic in-
crease in the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements by the Criminal Division—to a point that such agree-
ments have become routine—raises questions about their potential 
misuse.  Yet, even as reliance on deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements has surged within the Criminal Division and 
in some United States Attorney’s Offices, other litigating divisions in 
the Justice Department have used the practice only sparingly. 
This Part reviews the increased use of deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements by the Justice Department.  Part II.A re-
views data regarding deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements and how practices vary within the Department.  Part II.B 
considers possible explanations for the Department’s increased reli-
ance on non-criminal alternatives.  Part II.C analyzes concerns that 
have been raised about the increased use of deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements. 
A.  Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements Are Widely 
Used by the Criminal Division and Some U.S. Attorneys but Rarely by 
Other Litigating Divisions That Prosecute Corporate Crime 
The use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments, which began in 2001, increased dramatically starting in 2004 
and 2005.137  According to the data collected by Professor Garrett, the 
entire Justice Department entered just thirteen deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements in the nine years between 1992 and 
2000.138  In the next three years, as broader use of such agreements 
began, the Department entered another thirteen deferred prosecu-
                                                        
cludes convictions from 1994 to the present, although as noted previously it is incomplete 
prior to 2001.  See supra note 82. 
 135.  Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1870 (Ap-
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 136.  See infra text accompanying notes 145–150. 
 137.  Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50. 
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tion and non-prosecution agreements.139  In 2004 and 2005, the De-
partment averaged thirteen more agreements each year—as many in 
two years as the previous twelve years combined.140 
But 2004 and 2005 were just the beginning of what would be a 
dramatic surge in the use of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements.  From 2006 through 2012, the Justice De-
partment entered 216 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements with corporations, which is an average of nearly thirty-one 
agreements each year.141  During that seven-year period, the Justice 
Department never entered less than twenty-two such agreements (in 
2009) and entered as many as forty-one in one year (2007).142  While 
the Justice Department has stated that 2007 was an “aberration” be-
cause it was significantly higher than the years immediately before 
and after,143 the Department entered nearly as many deferred prose-
cution and non-prosecution agreements in 2010 (thirty-eight agree-
ments) and 2012 (thirty-seven agreements) as it had in 2007 (forty-
one agreements).144 
The use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments has occurred most often in the Justice Department’s Criminal 
Division.145  In its 2009 study regarding corporate crime and the use of 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, the GAO 
found that the Criminal Division used deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements more frequently than criminal prosecutions 
from fiscal year 2004 through 2009.146  During that six-year period, ac-
cording to the GAO study, the Criminal Division brought thirty-eight 
criminal prosecutions against corporations, while entering forty-four 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.147  In contrast, 
United States Attorneys prosecuted 1659 corporations during that 
timeframe and entered ninety-four deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements.148 
The Criminal Division’s preference for deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements has increased in the last three fiscal 
years, according to the database created by Professor Garrett.  In fiscal 
                                                        
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  GAO CORP. CRIME, supra note 43, at 13. 
 144.  Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50. 
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years 2010 through 2012, the Criminal Division entered twenty-two 
plea agreements with corporations.149  During the same three years, 
the Criminal Division entered forty-six deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, which is more than it entered during the 
previous six fiscal years combined.150  The Criminal Division still 
brings criminal charges against corporations—and it prosecutes indi-
viduals for their role in corporate crime—but it is startling how much 
it now favors deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.  
During the last three years, more than two-thirds of the Criminal Divi-
sion’s corporate cases have been resolved by deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements. 
The Criminal Division is not the only component within the Jus-
tice Department that makes frequent use of deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements.  From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal 
year 2012, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York entered twenty-nine deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements.151  During the same time period, a significant 
number of such agreements were entered by United States Attorneys 
in Massachusetts (16), New Jersey (12), the Central District of Cali-
fornia (11), and the Eastern District of New York (11).152  Still, those 
numbers pale in comparison to the ninety deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements entered by the Criminal Division during 
the same fiscal years. 
Moreover, the Criminal Division’s widespread use of deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements sets it apart from the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Divi-
sion, which are the two other litigating divisions at the Justice De-
partment that handle the most corporate criminal prosecutions.  Ac-
cording to the GAO report, the Environment and Natural Resources 
Division entered two deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements during the seventeen-year period from fiscal year 1993 to 
2009.153  The Antitrust Division entered three deferred prosecution 
                                                        
 149.  Garrett & Ashley, Plea Agreements, supra note 134. 
 150.  Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50. 
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 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 15 n.29, 35.  One of those cases involved a prosecution for false statements at 
a nuclear facility where there were significant questions about whether Nuclear Regulatory 
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and non-prosecution agreements during that same seventeen-year 
timeframe.154  Likewise, during fiscal years 2010 through 2012, the En-
vironment and Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division 
continued to favor criminal prosecution over deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements.  The Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division entered forty-two plea agreements with corporations 
during that three-year period, while entering just one deferred prose-
cution agreement.155  The Antitrust Division entered forty-five plea 
agreements with corporations during that three-year period, while en-
tering four non-prosecution agreements.156 
Of course, the Criminal Division is responsible for more criminal 
statutes than other parts of the Justice Department and has more 
criminal prosecutors than any other component.  It therefore makes 
sense that it might enter more deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements than other parts of the Department.  Yet the 
contrast is stark between the Criminal Division’s embrace of deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements and the degree to 
which the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Anti-
trust Division have avoided such agreements in most cases. 
The Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Anti-
trust Division were responsible for half of the cases listed in the Corpo-
rate Crime Reporter’s top 100 corporate prosecutions of the 1990s157 and 
continue to be aggressive in prosecuting corporate crime.  Environ-
mental crime was the largest category of corporate convictions in the 
2011 study by Professor Garrett; antitrust crime was third.158  As a re-
sult, while the Criminal Division may have broader criminal responsi-
bilities, the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the An-
titrust Division also have significant roles in corporate criminal 
prosecution. 
Another factor that might lead to more deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements in the Criminal Division is the fact that, 
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when it declines cases, they must be referred to other litigating divi-
sions for enforcement.  In contrast, the Environment and Natural Re-
source Division and the Antitrust Division have civil enforcement of-
fices within their divisions, which might facilitate referrals for civil 
enforcement.  Yet organizational structure does not explain why the 
Criminal Division uses deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements so much more than other divisions.  Criminal prosecutors 
never know when they decline a case whether it will be addressed by 
their civil counterparts, even if they work within a division that has civ-
il enforcement authority, because civil attorneys have their own prior-
ities and reach independent judgments about the merits of each case. 
B.  The Rationale for the Justice Department’s Embrace of Deferred 
Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
The variation in the Justice Department’s use of deferred prose-
cution and non-prosecution agreements makes it difficult to provide a 
rationale for the Department’s approach.  First, as the Department’s 
corporate prosecution policies state, deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements could be an attempt to avoid collateral con-
sequences like those that occurred in the Andersen case.  Second, the 
use of such agreements could be seen as an incentive for companies 
to waive attorney-client privilege and perhaps to appease critics of 
waiver requests.  Third, deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements, which emerged as an alternative during the Bush admin-
istration, could be viewed as the predictable response of a business-
friendly administration to increased corporate crime.  Fourth, the 
Department could be seeking to prioritize structural reform over 
prosecution.  I review each of these possible rationales before offering 
my own: a simple cost-benefit analysis that is at once opportunistic 
and motivated by expediency. 
The Justice Department’s stated justification for entering de-
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements is the desire to 
avoid collateral consequences.159  The 2008 revision to the Principles 
of Federal Prosecution for Business Organizations, which remains the 
only one of the four corporate prosecution guidance documents that 
mentions deferred prosecution, does so in the context of collateral 
consequences.160  In a September 2012 speech extolling the virtues of 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, the Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division repeated the justification 
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from the 2008 memo that prosecutors needed a middle ground be-
tween prosecution and declination to avoid undesired collateral harm 
to employees and shareholders.161 
Yet by the time the 2008 document had been issued, the surge in 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements had been on-
going for years under the Thompson Memo and the McNulty Memo, 
which only referenced pretrial diversions and in the context of coop-
eration.162  In fact, the Department entered more deferred prosecu-
tion and non-prosecution agreements in 2007 than any other year,163 
before the Department decided that collateral consequences had re-
placed cooperation as the justification for entering such agreements. 
Moreover, despite the focus on avoiding collateral consequences 
in the Principles of Federal Prosecution for Business Organizations, 
there is no evidence that deferred prosecution or non-prosecution is 
necessary to avoid the “death penalty” for corporations involved in 
criminal activity.164  To the contrary, most criminal prosecutions do 
not result in the severe collateral consequences incurred by Ander-
sen.165  Andersen was a special case because it was an accounting firm 
charged with massive accounting fraud.  Andersen’s conduct and the 
publicity it received might have compromised its business model even 
in the absence of a criminal conviction.166  No other high-profile pros-
ecutions have resulted in similar collateral consequences.167 
Of course, it is conceivable that there could be collateral conse-
quences short of the corporate death penalty that could harm em-
ployees or shareholders.  For example, a company could contract in 
size or lose shareholder value because of a criminal prosecution, as 
BP did in the wake of the Gulf oil spill.168  Or there might be concerns 
                                                        
 161.  Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div., 
Address at the New York City Bar Association: The Role of Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ments in White Collar Criminal Law Enforcement (Sept. 13, 2012). 
 162.  McNulty Memo, supra note 125, at § VII. 
 163.  Garrett & Ashley, Prosecution Agreements, supra note 50.  The Justice Department 
entered forty-one deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements in 2007.  Id. 
 164.  Gabriel H. Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Cor-
porate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132242. 
 165.  Id. at 36. 
 166.  Id. at 36–37. 
 167.  The top twenty-five companies from the Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade all 
remain in business.  Mokhiber, supra note 83; see also Markoff, supra note 164, at 29–31, 36 
(explaining that only five of the companies convicted of corporate crimes in the years 
2001–2010 went out of business). 
 168.  Christine Hauser, BP’s Shareholders Take It on the Chin, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at 
B1.  Ironically, the Criminal Division prosecuted BP despite these collateral consequences.  
Id. 
  
1322 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1295 
about the impact on innocent third parties, as in the WakeMed case 
in North Carolina.  In WakeMed, an $8 million deferred prosecution 
agreement was entered because criminal charges would have jeopard-
ized access to health care for elderly and poor residents who receive 
Medicare and Medicaid benefits.169 
Yet cases like WakeMed, where there was a real possibility of col-
lateral consequences affecting innocent third parties, appear to be 
more the exception than the rule.  There is no indication of similar 
collateral consequences in the overwhelming majority of cases re-
solved by deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.  In-
deed, it would be curious if there were such collateral consequences 
in more than two-thirds of the cases handled by the Criminal Division 
but rarely in cases handled by other Justice Department litigating divi-
sions. 
There is far more evidence that the Justice Department’s goal 
was to obtain privilege waivers through deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements, which occurred frequently after the is-
suance of the Thompson Memo.170  Indeed, since the surge in de-
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements occurred after 
the Thompson Memo, it would be more logical to conclude that privi-
lege waivers were the impetus for many of the deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements entered prior to 2008, as I argue in 
Part I.171  Corporate crime prosecutors want to ensure that corpora-
tions, like individuals, share information in their possession regarding 
their co-conspirators and accomplices in crime.172  Much of that in-
formation in the corporate context is shrouded in privilege, either 
because it involved communication between attorneys and corporate 
officials at the time of the misconduct or because it was developed af-
ter the fact during internal investigations conducted by outside coun-
sel.173 
Attorney-client privilege waivers had been obtained in plea 
agreements during the 1990s, but with criticism of the practice 
mounting after issuance of the Thompson Memo, prosecutors may 
have felt they needed to offer a greater benefit to corporations in ex-
change for privilege waivers.174  As noted above, the reference to pre-
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trial diversion in the Thompson Memo’s discussion of cooperation 
provides evidence that the Justice Department accelerated its use of 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution to secure privilege waiv-
ers.175  But the Department’s desire to obtain privilege waivers cannot 
explain why deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements 
continued after the Principles of Federal Prosecution for Business 
Organizations disavowed privilege waivers in 2008.  The desire to ob-
tain privilege waivers thus may explain the initial increase in deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, but it cannot explain 
their continued use by the Department over the last four years. 
A perhaps cynical explanation would be that the Bush admin-
istration, although it justified deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution with references to cooperation and collateral conse-
quences, was motivated simply by politics.  On this account, the surge 
in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements was a polit-
ical handout from a pro-business administration that was not commit-
ted to corporate prosecution. Such a partisan narrative may appeal to 
some; however, it lacks factual support.176  The Justice Department en-
tered 125 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements dur-
ing the first term of the Obama administration, just four fewer than 
the 129 deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements en-
tered by the Justice Department during both terms of the Bush ad-
ministration.177 
Still another explanation, offered by Professor Garrett, is that the 
Justice Department sought deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements to achieve structural reform within corporations that were 
accused of wrongdoing.178  According to Professor Garrett, the Justice 
Department made a conscious choice to prioritize structural reforms, 
which are contained in most deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, over more traditional punitive goals.179  In 
other words, ensuring future compliance became more important to 
the government than meting out punishment, particularly because 
individuals could still be criminally prosecuted and face incarceration. 
Professor Garrett marshals effectively empirical support for the 
argument that deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements 
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have emphasized corporate compliance programs.  But the frequent 
inclusion of structural reforms may prove too much about the Justice 
Department’s rationale for entering deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements.  After all, the Department sought similar 
structural reforms in plea agreements throughout the 1990s.180  In ad-
dition, the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the Anti-
trust Division, which rarely utilize deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, continue to insist on corporate compliance 
in plea agreements they negotiate.181  Indeed, even the Criminal Divi-
sion includes corporate compliance programs when it enters plea 
agreements, as demonstrated most recently by its agreements with BP 
Production and Exploration for the Gulf oil spill.182  If both plea 
agreements and deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments require corporate compliance programs, it is difficult to claim 
that the government must enter deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements to achieve structural reforms. 
I therefore would argue that the Justice Department’s motivation 
for pursuing deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements 
has been far less high-minded than concern for collateral conse-
quences or a desire for cooperation or structural reform.  For propo-
nents of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements the 
bottom line is the same: the Justice Department can obtain the same 
financial penalties, factual admissions, corporate cooperation, and 
structural reforms that could be achieved from plea agreements.183  In 
some cases, it could fare even better, at least in terms of financial 
penalties.184  But it nearly always fares at least as well as it would have 
with a corporate prosecution and without investing the investigative, 
prosecutorial, or judicial resources that might be needed in a corpo-
rate prosecution.185  It is a simple cost-benefit analysis.  The benefits 
are equal or greater than prosecution, and the costs are less. 
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Former Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray, who was 
an architect of the Thompson Memo and oversaw the growth in the 
use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements by the 
Criminal Division, described the benefit side of the analysis starkly in 
a 2004 speech.186  He stated: 
The DP structure has many of the same benefits as a convic-
tion.  In terms of remedies, anything that the judge could 
impose under the organizational sentencing guidelines can 
be required under a DP agreement.  Now, the DP won’t re-
sult in a criminal conviction if the defendant company com-
plies with the agreement, but filing charges sends a message 
[that] the public condemns the company’s conduct.187 
Representatives of the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division pre-
sented the same message during an Environmental Crimes Policy 
Committee Meeting in April 2005 when I headed the Justice Depart-
ment’s Environmental Crimes Section.188  The attorneys from the 
Fraud Section explained that deferred prosecution had become their 
default position, because it allowed them to prosecute cases more ef-
ficiently and achieve equal or better results. 
I hesitate to suggest that the government has been merely expe-
dient in pursuing deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments.  I have no doubt that at least some agreements were entered 
because of the desire to obtain full cooperation and perhaps out of 
concern about collateral consequences.  I also agree with Professor 
Garrett that the Justice Department values corporate compliance pro-
grams and sees them as a benefit of its deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements. 
But with so many rationales and no consistent narrative to sup-
port the Justice Department’s approach, it is hard to escape the con-
clusion that some prosecutors may be ambivalent about the role of 
corporate criminal prosecution and therefore willing to sacrifice it too 
readily for non-criminal alternatives that include otherwise attractive 
settlement terms.  A similar discomfort with corporate criminal prose-
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cution is reflected in the academic literature, which I discuss in Part 
III.  Such discomfort is misplaced in the Justice Department, however, 
which is responsible for upholding the rule of law. 
C.  Concerns About the Misuse of Deferred Prosecution and Non-
Prosecution Agreements 
The Justice Department’s embrace of deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements over the last decade has been criticized 
for a number of policy reasons.  Some have argued that the Depart-
ment favors large companies over small businesses, and domestic cor-
porations over foreign companies.189  Others have expressed concern 
about the extent to which the agreements focus on corporate compli-
ance programs and thus involve the Department in management con-
trols and structural reform that may go beyond its core area of litiga-
tion expertise.190  Those objections have been intensified as the De-
Department has supported the use of corporate monitors who often 
are former high-level officials at the Department.191  There also is lin-
gering discomfort with the lack of meaningful judicial oversight of de-
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.192  As noted pre-
viously, there has been widespread criticism of the Department’s 
position on cooperation by corporations. I agree with the first four 
concerns to varying degrees, as I discuss below.  With regard to coop-
eration, I fault the Department more for failing to make a better case 
for its position, which I also address below. 
First, empirical evidence suggesting that the Justice Department 
pursues non-criminal alternatives more frequently with large compa-
nies and domestic corporations should be troubling to the Depart-
ment.193  If larger companies are more likely to receive the benefits of 
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deferred prosecution or non-prosecution, it is hard to see how the 
Department is meeting its fundamental obligation to do justice and 
ensure the fair and even-handed enforcement of the law.  Much as we 
should be concerned about wealthy, individual defendants receiving 
more favorable treatment in the criminal justice system, it should not 
be the case that companies with greater financial resources fare better 
than small businesses.  For many of the same reasons, we should not 
allow global corporations to receive less favorable treatment in our 
criminal justice system than domestic corporations. 
Whether a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement 
is offered to a company should not depend on its corporate earnings, 
or on its domestic or foreign status.  The Justice Department would 
no doubt dispute that any such considerations influence its actions, 
and I will assume it does not intentionally favor large, domestic cor-
porations when deciding whether to enter deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements.  Still, even the appearance of such dis-
parate treatment—which the empirical evidence supports194—is a 
concern that the Justice Department should address.  If the Depart-
ment continues to use deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements, it should develop standards that ensure that eligibility for 
non-criminal disposition does not depend upon financial resources or 
whether a corporation is domestic or global. 
Second, it is reasonable to ask whether criminal prosecutors are 
best situated to seek structural reforms in corporate governance, as 
frequently occurs in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements.195  On the one hand, prosecutors are well informed about 
what makes for an ineffective corporate compliance program, but it 
does not follow that they have any particular expertise in how to trans-
late that knowledge into an understanding of what constitutes an ef-
fective corporate compliance program.  On the other hand, prevent-
ing future violations by companies is a legitimate law enforcement 
goal.  Including a commitment to corporate compliance as a term of 
agreements reached with corporate defendants would appear to be 
sound policy, and it also is understandable that the Justice Depart-
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ment seeks more than simple promises about compliance in its 
agreements.196 
Third, when the Justice Department selects corporate monitors 
who are former high-level officials within the Department, it should 
not be surprised that its actions are questioned.  Nor should the De-
partment negotiate for special terms of agreements that would sup-
port favorite charities or establish an endowed chair at the law school 
attended by the United States Attorney.197  Such practices, even if well 
intended, raise conflicts of interest and could be seen as self-dealing.  
The Department has wisely issued guidance about the selection of 
corporate monitors.198  The Department would be well advised to im-
plement similar policies to ensure that community service and other 
terms of its resolutions with corporations do not involve abuse of 
prosecutorial authority.199 
Fourth, there is little or no judicial oversight of deferred prosecu-
tion and non-prosecution agreements.200  In deferred prosecutions, 
charges are filed and the court must approve the waiver of the statute 
of limitations that occurs while prosecution is deferred.201  The result-
ing judicial review is at best perfunctory; no court has ever rejected a 
deferred prosecution agreement.202  With non-prosecution agree-
ments, there is no judicial role at all.203  Charges are never filed, so the 
                                                        
 196.  See USAM §§ 9-27.400, 9-27.800 (discussing plea agreements generally as well as 
corporate compliance programs). 
 197.  See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 916 (discussing the criticism faced 
by deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements that contained certain “com-
munity service” requirements not directly related to the underlying offense with which the 
company was charged). 
 198.  Memorandum from Craig S. Morford on Selection and Use of Monitors in De-
ferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations to 
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008). 
 199.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING GUIDANCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROSECUTIONS, INCLUDING THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING MEASURES (2000).  In 
the Gulf oil spill criminal prosecutions of BP Production and Exploration and Transocean, 
prosecutors have directed billions of dollars to the Congressionally-chartered National 
Wildlife Foundation for Gulf Coast restoration efforts.  Support for restoration efforts is 
laudable but it raises the question of whether prosecutors should control how funds from 
criminal settlements—and non-criminal alternatives—are spent. 
 200.  See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 921 (noting that judicial oversight of 
structural reform agreements remains limited).  But see United States v. HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6–13 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (holding that 
courts have authority to approve or reject deferred prosecution agreements pursuant to 
their supervisory powers to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings). 
 201.  18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2006); see also supra note 43. 
 202.  Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 893.  Judge Boyle’s criticism of the 
WakeMed deferred prosecution agreement is an exception to the de minimis review that 
usually occurs.  See supra note 169. 
 203.  Id. at 902–05. 
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agreement is merely a contract between the government and the cor-
poration.204  Judicial involvement does not guarantee that the public 
interest will be better served or that the rights of the corporate de-
fendant will be better protected.  But deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements occur in major, high-profile investigations.205  
The involvement of a neutral arbiter in a public forum would help 
ensure the fairness of the agreements and provide the accountability 
the public deserves. 
A related concern is that the Justice Department’s authority to 
enter deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements is lim-
ited.  There is a single statutory mention of deferred prosecution in 
the federal code section that addresses statute of limitations waivers.206  
Perhaps that reference may be an implicit acknowledgement that the 
Department is authorized to enter such agreements, but Congress has 
never explicitly provided such authority nor imposed limits on its 
proper use.  It should give us pause that the Justice Department is re-
solving a significant number of high-profile cases using agreements 
that are not subject to judicial review and for which the Department 
does not have express statutory authorization.207 
The controversy surrounding attorney-client privilege waivers has 
largely subsided since the 2008 revisions to the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution for Business Organizations disallowed such requests.  Yet 
the inclusion of privilege waivers in deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements remains one of the most heavily criticized as-
pects of the Justice Department’s use of such agreements.208  I agree 
with those who expressed concern about how often the Department 
requested privilege waivers prior to 2008; such waivers should only be 
sought in the unusual cases when they are necessary to obtain factual 
information about corporate crime.  I disagree with those who argue 
that the Department should never seek or credit privilege waivers 
from corporations.  Rather, I fault the Department for not making a 
stronger case for the limited use of privilege waiver requests. 
                                                        
 204.  Id. 
 205.  The average penalty in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements 
entered from 2001 to 2010 was $24 million; plea agreements entered during the same pe-
riod averaged $7.5 million.  Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135, at 1873. 
 206.  18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2006). 
 207.  See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 905 (“The Supreme Court has held 
that the executive branch ‘has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide 
whether to prosecute a case.’”). 
 208.  AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT 3–4 n.7 (2006), available at http://www.acca.com/ 
Surveys/attyclient2.pdf. 
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As noted in the previous Section, corporations can and should be 
expected to provide any information in their possession about crimi-
nal activity, if they intend to cooperate with a government investiga-
tion and receive credit in any agreement with the government resolv-
ing the corporation’s criminal liability.209  If that is possible to do 
without waiver of privilege, the government should not insist on waiv-
er.  But if waiver is necessary for the government to obtain complete 
cooperation from a corporation, it is not clear why the government 
should not be able to request privilege waivers.210 
I would suggest that the Justice Department went too far when it 
amended the Principles of Federal Prosecution for Business Organi-
zations in 2008.211  The attorney-client privilege deserves protection, 
and the government should limit its requests for waiver so that corpo-
rations are incentivized to seek counsel about their conduct and out-
side counsel can conduct effective internal investigation when crimi-
nal activity occurs.  But the idea that waivers of privilege were an 
abuse that needed to be precluded in all cases elevates the privilege 
beyond even the protection under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution against self-incrimination,212 which every cooperating in-
dividual defendant agrees to waive.  It is hard to see why an eviden-
tiary privilege, even one as essential to effective representation as the 
attorney-client privilege, should be entitled to greater protection than 
the constitutional rights provided by the Fifth Amendment. 
The Justice Department did not seek attorney-client privilege 
waivers more often because of its decision to allow deferred prosecu-
tion and non-prosecution agreements.  To the contrary, the Justice 
Department sought waivers in corporate cases during the 1990s, be-
fore the push for deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments, as the language of the Holder Memo (issued in 1999) made 
clear.213  It would be more accurate to say that the Department’s em-
brace of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution was an attempt to 
give more credit for waivers of attorney-client privilege, thus implicitly 
                                                        
 209.  See supra text accompanying notes 172 and 173. 
 210.  See Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV 1, 54 (2008) (“[R]etaining the ability of federal prosecu-
tors to ask a corporation to waive its attorney-client privilege . . . is in the public’s best in-
terest when waiver is necessary to conduct a complex criminal investigation efficiently.”). 
 211.  See Corporate Prosecution Principles, supra note 128. 
 212.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 213.  For example see the plea agreements in Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 98-
0103-CR-Middlebrooks (S.D. Fla. 1999) and John Morrell and Co. CR-96-40004 (D.S.D. 
1996). 
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acknowledging the criticism that already was mounting about waiver 
requests.  Some might view additional credit as coercing waivers but 
the broader point is that the criticism of the Department based on 
waiver requests is less about deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution and more a question of what steps cooperating corpora-
tions should be expected to take. 
In sum, the fairness concerns raised by deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements may have validity and would appear to 
warrant increased attention by the Justice Department.  Questions al-
so have been properly raised about special terms of deferred prosecu-
tion and non-prosecution agreements, although the Department has 
taken steps to address those issues.214  Concerns about structural re-
form and cooperation are less about deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, and more a matter of what the government 
should be seeking in resolutions with corporations.  The only degree 
to which those concerns are heightened in the deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution context is because of the coercive effect when 
the government bargains over whether there will be a criminal convic-
tion of the corporation.215  Whether it is appropriate for the govern-
ment to leverage the threat of criminal prosecution is one of the 
more fundamental questions raised by deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, which I address in the next Part. 
III.  DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 
UNDERMINE THE PROSECUTION OF CORPORATE CRIME 
The Justice Department’s increased use of deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements over the last decade is difficult to 
reconcile with the purposes of corporate criminal prosecution, the 
Department’s policies about pretrial diversion and non-prosecution, 
and the role of criminal prosecutors in the criminal justice system.  In 
this Part, I address each of these issues and the deleterious effects of 
the result-oriented embrace of deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements. 
                                                        
 214.  Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 916. 
 215.  Id. at 905. 
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A.  Deferred Prosecution and Non Prosecution Agreements Undermine the 
Purposes of Corporate Criminal Liability 
The United States has held corporations criminally liable for the 
better part of the last century,216 even though many other countries do 
not.217  Under our jurisprudence, corporations can be held criminally 
responsible for the acts of their employees or agents, committed with-
in the scope of the employment or agency, for the benefit of the cor-
poration.218  Corporate criminal liability can be imposed even if the 
conduct occurs at low levels within the corporation and in cases where 
the company had policies that forbade such conduct.219  In addition, 
corporations can be found to have the requisite mens rea for criminal 
culpability under the collective knowledge doctrine, even if no indi-
vidual within the company had the requisite intent.220 
The broad imposition of corporate criminal liability is not with-
out detractors.  The Model Penal Code recommended limiting corpo-
rate liability to circumstances where there was at least some evidence 
that management of the company was involved in the violations.221  
The Model Penal Code also would have allowed corporations to raise 
as a defense the fact that the company had internal rules forbidding 
such conduct.222  In these ways, the Model Penal Code sought to limit 
corporate criminal liability to situations where the corporation as a 
whole had a broader role and to avoid the imposition of liability 
based on the acts of individual employees. 
The Model Penal Code reforms have been rejected because of 
the belief that better management controls and training of subordi-
nates would prevent wrongdoing.223  In other words, the absence of 
management controls and training often results in wrongdoing, so 
that requiring active management involvement before imposing crim-
inal liability on the corporation would ignore the failure to act by 
management that often leads to misconduct.  Likewise, many corpo-
                                                        
 216.  Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism 
and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 868–70 (2003). 
 217.  Garrett, Globalized Prosecutions, supra note 135, at 1777–78. 
 218.  See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 34. 
 219.  United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004–06 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 220.  United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 221.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1962). 
 222.  Id.; see also Ellen S. Podger, A New Corporate World Mandates a Good Faith Affirmative 
Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2007) (discussing affirmative defenses, which re-
ward “company[ies] that act[] in good faith . . . to preclude improper conduct within its 
midst”). 
 223.  See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 35, at 903 (noting structural reforms that 
seek to prevent wrongdoing). 
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rate compliance programs exist only on paper and are not imple-
mented in ways that ensure compliance.  Where compliance is a man-
agement priority and promoted with training, auditing and internal 
mechanisms to achieve compliance, violations can be avoided. 
Others have criticized corporate criminal liability at a more fun-
damental level, arguing that there is no beneficial purpose served by 
imposing criminal liability on corporations.224  These criticisms start 
from the proposition that corporations exist only to achieve lawful 
purposes and therefore any unlawful action carried out in the name 
of the corporation is antithetical to the corporate charter.225  Even if it 
is possible for a corporation to act unlawfully, a corporation is a legal 
fiction that can never be a person as that term is understood in the 
broader criminal law.226  A corporation cannot be jailed.  It cannot 
lose its right to vote or its right to carry firearms or otherwise be de-
prived of its civil liberties in the way that individuals can, so it is fair to 
ask what purpose is served by the criminal prosecution of corpora-
tions. 
Still, others would argue, from a utilitarian standpoint, that there 
is nothing to be gained by criminal prosecution that cannot be 
achieved outside the criminal justice system.227  Admissions of liability, 
although often noticeably absent from civil penalty actions, could be 
required in civil cases.  Substantial fines could be imposed in civil cas-
es.  Consent decrees could include structural reforms, restitution ob-
ligations, and community service projects.  In other words, there is no 
term of a criminal settlement that could not be part of a civil settle-
ment—and it is far easier to impose civil liability (in terms of burden 
of proof) and the costs to society therefore are less.228 
Of course, it is true that corporations cannot be jailed and have 
“no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked.”229  It therefore 
may be less obvious that there is a retributivist argument to be made 
                                                        
 224.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 389 (1981) (suggesting 
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Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1478–79 (1996) (ex-
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 225.  See Khanna, supra note 224, at 1480 (“[Under] the ultra vires doctrine, . . . courts 
would not hold corporations accountable for acts, such as crimes, that were not provided 
for in their charters.”). 
 226.  See id. (“[The] courts’ literal understanding of criminal procedure . . . required 
the accused to be brought physically before the court.”). 
 227.  Id. at 1479. 
 228.  Id. at 1520–30. 
 229.  Coffee, supra note 224, at 386 (quoting Edward, First Baron Thurlow, the Lord 
Chancellor of England). 
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about the need for corporate criminal liability as a “just desserts” for 
engaging in criminal misconduct.  Yet we give corporations “person-
hood” in many other areas of the law, including most notably the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,230 so it would be inconsistent to 
deny their personhood in the context of the criminal law.  Moreover, 
the claim that corporations are not “real” persons, while obviously 
true in a biological sense, does not mean that corporations are not 
significant entities from an economic or moral standpoint.231 
Corporations dominate so many aspects of our economy and 
have such outsized ability to do good or harm in our communities 
that their conduct has impacts that far exceed what individuals can 
achieve.232  Corporations employ citizens and provide goods and ser-
vices on a scale that individuals cannot.  Corporations can innovate 
and provide opportunities that individual action cannot.  On the oth-
er hand, when corporations engage in misconduct, the resulting 
harms may far exceed the suffering inflicted by an individual.  Be-
cause of their sheer size, a corporate polluter can cause far more envi-
ronmental harm than an individual.  A company that makes unsafe 
products can create far greater public health risks.  Most corporations 
comply with the law and contribute in a positive ways in our commu-
nities, but there are some companies that break the law and risk or 
cause great harm. 
I also would suggest that corporations can be moral actors.  Cor-
porate ethics is a significant topic in business schools and boardrooms 
and matters to corporate leadership, employees, and investors.233  
Corporations promote economic activity but also work to be good 
corporate citizens in their communities through civic engagement 
and charitable work.  When they act responsibly, corporations are 
valued beyond their economic contributions.  They serve as role 
models, not only to their employees, but also to their customers and 
                                                        
 230.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (rec-
ognizing that the First Amendment applies to corporations) (citations omitted); Pac. Gas 
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other companies.  Conversely, when corporations engage in miscon-
duct, their actions may be unethical or immoral. 
I therefore assert that corporate wrongdoing deserves criminal 
punishment.  We can debate whether too much conduct is criminal-
ized in America and whether the criminal law has been used too often 
to address social and economic problems.234  But within the spheres 
that we impose criminal liability, corporations can engage in miscon-
duct that deserves criminal punishment, even if that punishment 
cannot include incarceration.235  Incarceration is not the only form of 
punishment we impose, even on individuals, and yet we always think 
of a criminal punishment as different in kind from a non-criminal 
sanction.  That distinction holds true for corporations as well. 
Likewise, while some argue there is no utilitarian justification for 
imposing corporate criminal liability, the deterrent value of a criminal 
penalty may carry more weight than a civil penalty.236  As I suggest 
above, criminal penalties are different in kind than civil penalties.237  
They cannot be dismissed as a mere cost of doing business because 
they impose reputational damage in addition to financial conse-
quences.238  While some scholars dispute whether the possibility of 
reputational damage is a deterrent,239 my experience in corporate 
plea negotiations for many years at the Justice Department suggests 
that companies care about the reputational harm of a criminal con-
viction.  Criminal penalties also carry collateral consequences, such as 
the loss of government contracting,240 that make criminal sanctions a 
better deterrent than otherwise comparable civil penalties. 
                                                        
 234.  On the overcriminalization debate, see Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenome-
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Perhaps most significantly of all, criminal prosecution has an ex-
pressive function that cannot be achieved by non-criminal disposi-
tion.241  Criminal prosecution has a stigmatizing effect that civil en-
forcement does not.242  “Criminal law is ultimately different from tort 
and other civil law, not because it demands more culpability but be-
cause of the condemnation it imposes on the transgressors.”243  When 
we criminalize conduct, we make clear that it is outside the bounds of 
acceptable conduct in our society.244  While some civil penalties can 
have the same effect, there is a qualitative difference in labeling con-
duct criminal.245 
If the prosecution of corporate crime serves retributive, utilitari-
an, and expressive purposes, it follows that the failure to prosecute 
criminally by entering deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements will diminish those effects.  We achieve less in terms of 
punishment and deterrence when we enter deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements.  We fail to express societal condemna-
tion when we agree that charges will be dismissed or not brought at 
all.  Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution minimize criminal 
conduct and may risk condoning it.  As Professor Kahan has ex-
plained, “when society deliberately foregoes answering the wrongdoer 
through punishment, it risks being perceived as endorsing his valua-
tions [and thus his misconduct].”246 
Nor is it sufficient to say that we will rely on the criminal prosecu-
tion of individuals to punish and deter wrongdoing.  In far too many 
cases of corporate wrongdoing, it is not possible to identify senior lev-
el management who are criminally liable.  In some cases, the individ-
uals involved are at such low levels and have received such poor train-
ing that prosecution of individuals is not appropriate.  Even in cases 
where there are individual defendants, we send a mixed message soci-
etally when we say that the individuals have acted criminally but the 
corporation that benefited from their misconduct did not.  Yet that is 
exactly the message we send with deferred prosecution agreements 
and even more so with non-prosecution agreements. 
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B.  The Justice Department Is Contravening Its Policies by Entering 
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
The frequent use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements over the last decade cannot be reconciled with Justice 
Department policies governing criminal prosecution.  As Part I of this 
Article notes, deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements 
surged after the Thompson Memo was issued in 2003 based on a ref-
erence to pretrial diversion in the section on cooperation.  Yet, nei-
ther the Department’s policies on pretrial diversion nor its policies on 
cooperation justify the extensive use of deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements that ensued after 2003. 
Pretrial diversion always has been limited to individuals with little 
or no history of misconduct and to crimes that were less serious.  The 
Justice Department’s policies on pretrial diversion are set by each 
United States Attorney’s office but uniformly hold that pretrial diver-
sion is not available for repeat offenders who commit serious crimes.  
Yet, the Justice Department has entered deferred prosecution and 
non-prosecution agreements with corporations that had a history of 
serious violations and committed egregious crimes. 
The Upper Big Branch mining disaster may be the best example 
of how far the Justice Department has strayed from the pretrial diver-
sion model.  Massey had a terrible history of environmental and 
worker safety violations.  The company already had been criminally 
prosecuted at another facility.  On that basis alone, Massey’s conduct 
should not have qualified for deferred prosecution or non-
prosecution.  Moreover, Massey’s crimes resulted in the deaths of 
twenty-nine miners.  Even without a history of violations, Massey’s 
conduct was too egregious for deferred prosecution or non-
prosecution.247 
Another example of the misuse of deferred prosecution is the 
HSBC case.  In announcing its deferred prosecution agreement with 
HSBC, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division stat-
ed, “HSBC is being held accountable for stunning failures of over-
sight—and worse—that led the bank to permit narcotics traffickers 
and others to launder hundreds of millions of dollars through HSBC 
subsidiaries, and to facilitate hundreds of millions more in transac-
tions with sanctioned countries.”248  The government never would 
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have agreed to pretrial diversion for individuals involved in such 
egregious misconduct, yet it was willing to enter a deferred prosecu-
tion agreement with HSBC.  With money laundering claims that to-
taled nearly a trillion dollars, it is difficult to understand how anything 
less than a criminal prosecution would provide the accountability 
touted by the Criminal Division.249 
Nor are the Massey and HSBC cases outliers.  Other deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements have been entered in 
cases involving millions of dollars in fraud, securities violations, and 
other egregious misconduct that never would qualify for pretrial di-
version.  Indeed, it is hard to discern any limits on what crimes would 
be eligible for deferred prosecution or non-prosecution, at least in 
cases brought by the Criminal Division, which contorts the pretrial di-
version model. 
The Justice Department’s policies on non-prosecution in ex-
change for cooperation also have been honored in the breach in the 
rush to enter deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.  
The Thompson Memo notes that the United States Attorney Manual 
allows prosecutors to enter “a non-prosecution agreement in ex-
change for cooperation when a corporation’s ‘timely cooperation ap-
pears to be necessary to the public interest and other means of ob-
taining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be 
effective.’”250  A closer examination of these requirements shows how 
far the Department has strayed from its policies regarding coopera-
tion. 
First, the United States Attorneys’ Manual expresses a strong 
preference for obtaining cooperation by entering plea agreements 
that involve either a reduction in charges or sentencing considera-
tion.251  These alternatives are described as “clearly preferable to per-
mitting an offender to avoid any liability for [its] conduct,” and pros-
ecutors are advised that “the possible use of an alternative to a non-
prosecution agreement should be given serious consideration in the 
first instance.”252  In other words, non-prosecution only occurs if co-
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operation cannot be obtained through a plea agreement or an alter-
native that preserves the Department’s ability to prosecute criminally. 
Of course, it is not possible for us to know what steps the Justice 
Department took to secure cooperation in the nearly 300 cases it has 
resolved by deferred prosecution or non-prosecution.  Given how fre-
quently other parts of the Department obtain cooperation using plea 
agreements, however, it is likely that the Department is not limiting 
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution to cases where it cannot 
obtain cooperation by other means.  Rather, it seems apparent that 
the Department is electing to enter deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements whenever it opportunistically chooses to 
forego criminal prosecution, not because it must to obtain coopera-
tion. 
Second, the United States Attorney’s Manual describes the bal-
ancing that prosecutors must do if they “conclude[] that a non-
prosecution agreement would be the only effective method for ob-
taining cooperation.”253  Prosecutors are advised to consider the cost 
of foregoing prosecution against the benefit of cooperation and de-
termine whether non-prosecution is in the public interest.254  The 
public interest test requires weighing (1) the importance of the case; 
(2) the value of the cooperation; and (3) the relative culpability and 
criminal history of the defendant.255  In this regard, the Justice De-
partment policies are different than its pretrial diversion policies, in-
asmuch as non-prosecution only is allowed in “cases in which the co-
operation sought concerns the commission of a serious offense.”256  
Significantly, however, the Department makes clear that “[s]ince the 
primary function of a Federal prosecutor is to enforce the criminal 
law, he[] should not routinely or indiscriminately enter into non-
prosecution agreements, which are, in essence, agreements not to en-
force the law under particular conditions.”257 
By 2008, the Justice Department had shifted its rationale for de-
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreement to the avoidance 
of collateral consequences.258  The Department provided little guid-
ance about how that decision should be made other than to state tau-
tologically that “the appropriateness of a criminal charge against a 
corporation, or some lesser alternative, must be evaluated in a prag-
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matic and reasoned way that produces a fair outcome, taking into 
consideration, among other things, the Department’s need to pro-
mote and ensure respect for the law.”259  The blanket authorization to 
enter “fair” deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements 
with corporations stands in stark contrast to the Department’s restric-
tive approach to non-prosecution in all other contexts. 
Moreover, the Justice Department’s reliance on collateral conse-
quences as a justification for deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements is inconsistent with the Department’s policies 
on nolo contendere or “no contest” pleas.260  For decades, the Justice 
Department has opposed efforts by defendants to enter no contest 
pleas, which corporations sought both as a way to limit their admis-
sions about criminal conduct and to avoid the collateral estoppel ef-
fect of guilty pleas in parallel civil litigation.  The Department re-
quires prosecutors to “oppose the acceptance of a plea nolo 
contendere unless the Assistant Attorney General with supervisory re-
sponsibility over the subject matter concludes that the circumstances 
of the case are so unusual that acceptance of such a plea would be in 
the public interest.”261  The United States Attorney’s Manual quotes 
former Attorney General Herbert Brownwell, Jr., who stated: 
One of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for 
Federal law enforcement in recent times has been the prac-
tice of permitting as a matter of course in many criminal in-
dictments the plea of nolo contendere.  While it may serve a 
legitimate purpose in a few extraordinary situations and 
where civil litigation is also pending, I can see no justifica-
tion for it as an everyday practice, particularly where it is 
used to avoid certain indirect consequences of pleading 
guilty.262 
Attorney General Brownwell’s concerns about the use of no contest 
pleas as a matter of course—and his view that they should not as part 
of “everyday practice” be used as a vehicle for avoiding the collateral 
consequences of pleading guilty—would appear to apply with equal 
or greater force to the more favorable outcome of deferred prosecu-
tion or non-prosecution. 
It is revealing that the Justice Department continues to vehe-
mently oppose no contest pleas—which at least result in a criminal 
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conviction—but routinely allows companies to enter deferred prose-
cution and non-prosecution agreements.  In the past, to avoid enter-
ing a guilty plea for criminal violations, a corporation would have to 
convince the Department that it was the extraordinary situation where 
a no contest plea should be authorized by an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral.  Today, the same corporation can obtain an even better outcome 
with little or no showing of extraordinary circumstances and no re-
quirement of Assistant Attorney General approval. 
C.  Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Distorts the Role of the 
Criminal Prosecutor 
As the preceding Sections demonstrate, the frequent use of de-
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements is not consistent 
with the theoretical purposes of corporate criminal prosecution or 
the Justice Department’s policies.  In addition, the use of such agree-
ments distorts the role of the criminal prosecutor, makes it appear 
that companies can buy their way out of criminal prosecution, and re-
veals ambivalence in the government’s approach to prosecuting cor-
porate crime. 
Prosecutors regularly exercise discretion about which violations 
warrant criminal prosecution and which should be declined.  There 
may be no more essential role for prosecutors than the fair exercise of 
discretion to decide which criminal violations warrant criminal prose-
cution and the possible imposition of criminal sanctions, if the de-
fendant is found guilty.  It would be difficult to overstate the power 
conferred on prosecutors when they decide whether to bring criminal 
charges, since a mere accusation can have devastating effects on the 
defendant, even if the case goes to trial and the defendant is acquit-
ted.263 
We can and should expect prosecutors to exercise sound judg-
ment in the threshold decision about whether a particular violation of 
the law warrants criminal prosecution.  If, in accordance with the 
Principles of Federal Prosecution,264 the prosecutor determines that a 
case warrants prosecution, charges should be brought.  If she deter-
mines the case does not justify criminal prosecution, the case should 
be declined.  The choice is fundamental to the fair administration of 
our criminal justice system.  There should be no middle ground be-
tween criminal prosecution and declination, unless to serve some de-
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fined and limited purpose like rehabilitation of first-time offenders 
who commit non-serious crimes or when necessary to obtain essential 
cooperation.  It may be appropriate to also allow deferred prosecu-
tion or non-prosecution in exceptional cases like WakeMed, where 
the government was able to demonstrate that innocent third parties 
would suffer unacceptable harm.265  But those cases, like instances 
warranting no contest pleas, should occur rarely and only with Assis-
tant Attorney General approval. 
The government erodes corporate criminality by using deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements as a substitute for crim-
inal prosecution.  When a prosecutor concludes that the conduct in-
volved is too egregious to decline criminal charges—that the conduct 
must be addressed in the criminal justice system—the prosecutor 
should seek criminal charges.  The decision to pursue a non-criminal 
alternative betrays the prosecutor’s determination about the inherent 
wrongfulness and criminality of the defendant’s conduct.  Worse, it 
creates the appearance that a corporate defendant can “undo” the 
criminal nature of its conduct if the company offers attractive enough 
terms to entice the government to agree to a deferred prosecution or 
non-prosecution. 
Conversely, the government misuses its criminal enforcement au-
thority by entering deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments as a substitute for declination.  When a prosecutor concludes 
that criminal prosecution is unwarranted—that criminal charges and 
criminal sanctions are too severe—the prosecutor should decline 
criminal charges.  Under these circumstances, negotiating the terms 
of a non-criminal disposition is an abuse of prosecutorial authority.  
In effect, the prosecutor is leveraging the threat of criminal charges 
that she believes should not be brought to coerce the defendant into 
entering a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement.  Just 
as prosecutors who have decided to decline should not use the threat 
of criminal prosecution to obtain civil settlements,266 it is inappropri-
ate for the government to use the threat of criminal prosecution to 
obtain a deferred or non-prosecution agreement, when the prosecu-
tor does not intend to prosecute. 
It could be argued that prosecutorial discretion does not involve 
such a binary set of choices between prosecution and declination.  Af-
ter all, prosecutors regularly exercise discretion over which charges to 
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pursue.  Prosecutors properly offer defendants the opportunity to 
plead guilty to lesser charges than might be pursued at trial.  In still 
other circumstances, prosecutors may decide that conduct, while 
criminal, is not serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution.  But 
even in these scenarios, prosecutors are making a fundamental choice 
about whether the conduct will be handled criminally. 
It also merits emphasis that much corporate crime occurs in the 
regulatory context or involves conduct like fraud where civil remedies 
also are available to the government.  In those cases, the use of de-
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution is a particularly egregious 
distortion of the role of the criminal prosecutor.  For most regulatory 
violations, the government has a range of enforcement options that 
include criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement.267  If a partic-
ular violation does not warrant criminal enforcement—in other words 
when it is not necessary to impose a criminal punishment or label the 
underlying conduct as criminal—the government can and should use 
civil or administrative enforcement to impose penalties and any cor-
rective actions.  There is no evidence that the government requires a 
fourth option in addition to those it already possesses.  Nor is there 
any indication that Congress intended to provide for more than crim-
inal, civil, or administrative enforcement for regulatory violations 
(although some regulatory schemes offer only civil or administrative 
enforcement as alternatives to criminal prosecution, not both). 
Ultimately, what may be most disconcerting about the Justice 
Department’s approach to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements is its willingness to consider non-criminal resolutions even 
in egregious cases of corporate crime.  When the most serious crimi-
nal violations can be handled outside the criminal justice system—
cases involving deaths and double-sets of books or hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in fraud claims—it raises questions about the Depart-
ment’s commitment to prosecuting corporate crime.  And in the pro-
cess, the concept of corporate criminality is eroded and the rule of 
law is weakened. 
The Justice Department still prosecutes corporate crime.  It does 
so because corporate wrongdoing can have devastating effects that 
warrant punishment under retributive and utilitarian theories.  It 
prosecutes criminally because labels matter, and we communicate far 
more about our condemnation of wrongdoing when we call conduct 
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criminal, whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual.268  
As a law enforcement institution, the Justice Department does not be-
lieve that criminal prosecution of corporations serves no purpose.  So 
it is all the more curious that the Department is pursuing such an 
ambivalent approach to corporate prosecution: extolling its virtues 
and essential role in upholding the rule of law when it prosecutes; in-
dulging a results-oriented, ends-justify-the-means approach that dis-
counts the criminal sanction when it does not. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Justice Department can and should be expected to make 
principled decisions about whether criminal prosecution of corpora-
tions is warranted.  If the law and the facts justify prosecution, charges 
should be brought; they should not be sacrificed in favor of deferred 
prosecution or non-prosecution.  If the conduct does not rise to the 
level that warrants criminal prosecution, the matter should be de-
clined.  Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, if 
they occur at all, should be limited to relatively minor cases where civ-
il or administrative enforcement is not available or the exceptional 
case where other non-criminal alternatives are inadequate.  Non-
criminal alternatives should never be allowed in egregious cases like 
the Upper Big Branch mining disaster, unless there is insufficient evi-
dence to support criminal prosecution. 
The Justice Department should amend its corporate prosecution 
policies to make clear when deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements may be considered, as well as the categories 
of criminal activity that cannot be resolved by such agreements.  The 
Assistant Attorney General approval requirements that govern no 
contest pleas also should apply to deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements.  By developing guidelines that curtail the 
overuse of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, 
the Justice Department will ensure a principled and consistent ap-
proach to the prosecution of corporations, uphold the rule of law, 
and restore confidence in the Department’s efforts to combat corpo-
rate crime. 
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